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Providing public services through the internet is an effective 
approach towards an encompassing number of citizens being 
covered by them and for cost reduction. However, the fast 
development of this area has fostered discussion and legislation 
regarding information security and trustworthiness. In addition to 
security mechanisms for data processed and stored internally, 
service providers must ensure that data exchanged between their 
servers and citizens are not intercepted or modified when 
traversing heterogeneous and uncontrolled networks. Moreover, 
such institutions should provide means enabling the citizen to 
verify the authenticity of the services offered. In this way, the 
present work provides a comprehensive overview regarding the 
security posture of Portuguese public institutions in their online 
services. It consists of non-invasive robustness evaluation of the 
deployed solutions for end-to-end data encryption and the correct 
use of digital certificates. As a result, we provide some 
recommendations aiming to enhance the current panorama in the 
majority of the 111 online services considered in this study. 
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• Security and privacy → Privacy protections; • Social and 
professional topics → Privacy policies; • Applied computing 
→ E-government; 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The continuous growth of global Internet access driven by 
cheaper personal devices and advances in broadband 
communication [1] has fostered the use of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) as a platform of proximity 
between public services and citizens. This approach is generically 
called Electronic Governance (EGOV), and the enhancements 
leveraged by it include efficiency in deploying a variety of 
services, a higher number of citizens covered by them, and long-
term cost reduction. 
   Despite the underlying convenience, several of these services 
require a frequent exchange of personal and sensitive data, for 
instance, income tax return, medical reports, and social security 
information. Usually, such data is predominantly transmitted 
through networks controlled by multiple organizations other than 
the service provider itself, which might expose essential public 
services to security incidents. 
   In response to the security risks involved in providing services 
over the Internet, some international legislations, such as the 
European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [2] and 
similar in Brazil2, Morocco3, and Argentina4 are pushing public 
and private service providers towards a better control of personal 
data processed by them. 
   Some of the most common threats to which users are exposed to 
when accessing online services are (i) spoofing – when an attacker 
masquerades a trustworthy entity aiming to steal user data; (ii) 
information disclosure – when the confidentiality of users’ data is 
compromised by an attacker eavesdropping the communication 
channel; and (iii) data tampering – when the integrity of data 
traversing the network is affected by either intentional or 
accidental modifications [3]. 
During the last two decades, several technologies have been 
developed to address these issues by resorting to a cryptography 
basis to provide secure end-to-end communication, e.g., Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) protocol and online identity certification, 
e.g., public key certificates. Despite their high effectiveness, many 
services still do not support such technologies or do support 
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without following the best practices, for instance, maintaining 
available legacy versions or broken cryptographic algorithms. 
In this context, the main objective of this work is to provide an 
overview of how Portuguese public institutions address 
confidentiality, integrity, and trustworthiness in the 
communication between their online services and the citizens. To 
pursue this, 111 websites from national institutions were analyzed 
through non-invasive techniques in order to characterize their 
cryptographic suites, the existence of known vulnerabilities, and 
the usage of digital certificates. 
The next sections of this paper are organized as follows: 
Section 2 introduces the main technologies related to end-to-end 
secure communications and the use of digital certificates as a tool 
to ensure online identity. Section 3 presents the methodology used 
to highlight the security mechanisms adopted in communications 
between public services and citizens. Section 4 discusses the 
research outcomes, while Section 5 concludes the paper by 
providing some guidelines about secure communication for online 
public services. 
2. COMMUNICATION SECURITY AND 
TRUSTWORTHINESS 
When offering a service via Internet, a provider has the capacity 
to implement different mechanisms aiming the security of 
information processed and stored on its servers. However, due to 
the open Internet’s nature, exchanging data between servers and 
users implies transmission over networks controlled by different 
entities, and frequently, with opaque security policies. This 
scenario rises two main concerns: (i) the guarantee that an online 
service is provided by an authentic entity; and (ii) the data 
transmitted between servers and clients remains private and 
unchanged while in transit. 
   The most effective mechanisms designed to cope with both 
issues have their basis in the field of cryptography. For the first 
case, the proper use of digital certificates allows high confidence 
about the authenticity of a service provider, while encrypting the 
transport-level data flows with robust algorithms is a well-
established approach to overcome the second issue. Typically, 
these approaches are used in conjunction and sustain secure 
versions of popular protocols, for instance, the Hyper Text 
Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), which supports the majority 
of all secure web communication [4]. These technologies are 
briefly discussed along the next sections. 
2.1. Digital certificates 
A digital certificate is an electronic document or container file that 
contains a key value and identifying information about the entity 
that controls the key [5]. In online communications, the certificate 
owner (i.e., typically the service provider) sends a copy of its 
certificate containing a cryptographic public key mathematically 
related to a private key. By authenticating the embedded key, a 
user can verify the authenticity of any organization’s certificates. 
Such property is sustained by two main components, namely a 
Certification Authority (CA) and a Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI). 
   Certification authorities are entities able to issue a certificate 
vouching for the identity of any other entity providing online 
services. It consists in a model of trust relationships, where both 
subjects in a communication, i.e., the client and the service 
provider (certificate owner) relies upon the certificate issued by 
the CA. A recent research [6] has identified 1832 CA worldwide, 
which are controlled by 683 organizations. Globally, three 
organizations control 75% of all trusted certificates. 
   Such certificates are created, managed, distributed, stored and 
revoked through a Public Key Infrastructure, which consists in a 
set of hardware, software, protocols, legal agreements, processes, 
and procedures required in secure communications based on 
public key cryptography. Users rely on such infrastructure in 
order to validate a certificate received from an online service 
provider. 
   Different client-server applications use different types of digital 
certificates to accomplish their assigned functions. Web servers 
and web application servers use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 
certificates to authenticate servers via the SSL protocol in order to 
establish an encrypted SSL session [5]. The SSL protocol is 
introduced later in this chapter. 
   It is important to observe that anyone can issue SSL certificates, 
which are usually called self-signed certificates. However, they 
will not be trusted automatically by client applications (e.g., web 
browsers), requiring a CA validation, as it has the ability to issue 
publicly trusted SSL certificates. 
   Two popular certificate types are created using Pretty Good 
Privacy (PGP) [7] and applications that conform to International 
Telecommunication Union’s (ITU-T) X.509 version 3 [8]. Figure 
1 presents the structure of a X.509v3 certificate. 
 
2.2. Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
 
Once the service provider’s authenticity has been confirmed, a 
secure communication can be established between the client 
application and the service server resorting to the same 
cryptographic principles applied to the certificates. Such secure 
channel is deployed by using a network protocol designed to 
prevent eavesdropping, data tampering, and message forgery [9], 
namely the old SSL, deprecated by the Transport Layer Security 
(TLS), currently in version 1.3 [10]. 
   Some of the main advantages of using such protocols include 
providing authentication, confidentiality, and integrity in end-to-
end communications even in the face of an attacker who has 
complete control of the network [11], and being application 
protocol independent, meaning that higher-level protocols (e.g., 
HTTP) can be deployed on top of the SSL/TLS protocols 
transparently [12]. 
   The current protocol version is composed of two layers (i) a 
handshake protocol, responsible for authenticating entities in a 
communication, negotiating cryptographic modes and parameters, 
and establishing shared keying data; and (ii) a record protocol, 
that uses the parameters set during the handshake process to 
protect traffic between the entities [10]. Figure 2 presents a 
simplified diagram5 of a secure communication establishment 
based on the TLS protocol, followed by its description. 
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Figure 1: X.509v3 Certificate Structure 
1) The communication starts with a "client hello" message 
from the client to the server aiming to establish a 
connection. This message contains its TLS version, 
supported cipher suites, algorithm preferences, and a 
nonce random value Rc to be further used;  
2) The server responds by sending a “server hello” 
message to the client, along with its choices regarding 
the client supported cipher suites and algorithms, and its 
nonce random value Rs; 
3) The server sends its certificate containing a public key 
to the client for authentication purposes, as described in 
Section 2.1. Although not depicted in Figure 2, the 
server may request a certificate from the client for 
mutual authentication; 
4) The client creates a random Pre-Master Secret and 
encrypts it with the public key from the server’s 
certificate, sending the encrypted Pre-Master Secret to 
the server. After receiving the Pre-Master Secret, the 
server and client each generate the Master Secret and 
session keys based on the Pre-Master Secret; 
5) The client sends "Change cipher spec" notification to 
server to indicate that it will start using the new session 
keys for hashing and encrypting messages. Based on 
this message, the server switches its record layer 
security state to symmetric encryption using the session 
keys; 
6) Client and server can now exchange application data 
over the secured channel they have established. All 
messages sent from client to server and from server to 
client are encrypted using session key. 
 
 
Figure 2: Simplified TLS handshake. 
   The process of cryptography negotiation represented in Figure 2 
is essential towards the security of citizen data when interacting 
with online public services. Usually, in the presence of a valid 
certificate and any SSL/TLS protocol version, the client browser 
shows a padlock indicating that traffic between the browser and 
server is encrypted. However, it does not mean that the best 
cryptographic algorithms are being used to secure such 
communication. Old versions of these protocols still support weak 
or broken ciphers, for instance, the popular RC4 and MD5, used 
in symmetric data encryption, and to verify data integrity, 
respectively, that are no longer recognized as strong choices, due 
to vulnerabilities to which both are currently exposed [13]. 
   Even considering that most of the main software libraries (e.g., 
OpenSSL) provide the flexibility to disable a subset of their sup- 
ported ciphers, it is still common to find online services allowing 
communications based on weak or broken options. To identify the 
overall posture of Portuguese public service providers regarding 
the proper adoption of digital certificates and secure 
communications is the main objective of this work. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
Aiming to provide an encompassing overview on how Portuguese 
public institutions address confidentiality, integrity, and 
trustworthiness in the communication between their online 
services and the citizens, a set of non-invasive scanning 
techniques were applied to 111 domains from 95 public 
institutions, including municipalities. 
   The domains analyzed were selected through surveys in online 
public directories and DNS6 requests to the specific Second-Level 
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Domain gov.pt. Due to security and privacy issues, the domains’ 
name will not be listed in this work, as well as the analysis 
outcome will be presented aggregately. 
   The non-invasive scanning techniques adopted consist of 
analyzing the responses from each domain server during the 
execution of the SSL/TLS handshake protocol described in 
Section 2.2. To do so, two main tools were used: (i) nmap7 – a 
free and open source utility for network discovery and security 
auditing; and (ii) SSL Labs8 – an online collection of documents 
and tools developed to assess how TLS/SSL protocols are 
deployed. 
   Basically, in step 2 (i.e., Figure 2) the server provides a list of 
all its supported cipher suites, algorithms, and preferences. It 
allows assessing whether each server accepts secure connection 
based on weak or broken algorithms. Such analysis is performed 
by comparing the resulting list with state of the art in this field 
and with public vulnerability databases (e.g., NVD9). 
   In step 3 (i.e., Figure 2), the server sends its digital certificate, 
allowing the analysis of the underlying certification chain in order 
to ensure the service provider’s authenticity. 




Following the assessment methodology described in Section 3, the 
first outcomes show that although being a well-established 
mechanism to provide secure communications, 20% of the 111 
surveyed domains do not support any version of SSL/TLS 
protocols (see Table 1). It means that, without a cryptographic 
solution at the application layer, all data being exchanged between 
clients and servers are unprotected against eavesdropping and 
tampering, as the underlying traffic traverses the internet in plain 
text. In addition, they also do not provide any digital certificate, 
which hampers the user capability of validating the service 
authenticity. 
   Considering the remaining 78 services which do support secure 
communications, 15% do not have a valid digital certificate, either 
for not providing information about the complete certification 
chain or for using expired, untrusted or self-assigned certificates. 
As presented in Table 1, from all 111 services scanned, around 
34% do not provide reliable mechanisms validating its 
authenticity. 
 
Table 1: Summary of the survey. 
 Yes No 
Secure transport layer 80% 20% 
Valid certificate 66% 34% 
Weak ciphers 73% 27% 
Presence of vulnerabilities 65% 35% 
 
   Regarding the overall protocol version support, Figure 3 shows 
that only one service has the most recent and secure TLS protocol 
(i.e., version 1.3 [10]) implemented. On the other hand, 19 
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services still support the old and insecure SSLv2 and SSLv3. 
These protocols versions can be used to attack RSA keys and sites 
with the same name even if they are on an entirely different server 
(CVE-2016-080010) and for a man-in-the-middle attacker to 
obtain clear text data via a padding-oracle attack (CVE-2014-
3566), respectively. As detailed in Figure 4, both vulnerabilities 
represent a high confidentiality risk according to the Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS 3.0), meaning that there is a 
total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the 
impacted component being disclosed to the attacker [14]. 
   In addition, 31% of the services also still support legacy TLS 
v1.0 protocol. Its major vulnerability (i.e., CVE-2011-3389) has 
been mitigated in modern browsers, however other problems 
remain [15]. 
   Figure 3 also shows that 28% of the scanned domains support 
TLS in version 1.1 and 32% support TLS in version 1.2. Although 
neither has known security issues, only version 1.2 provides 
modern cryptographic algorithms. 
 
 
Figure 3: Secure transport protocols 
   Extending the analysis of confidentiality issues, Figure 3 high- 
lights a significant number of online public services exposed to 
high impact known vulnerabilities. Namely, 46 are exposed to 
CVE-2016-6329 or CVE-2016-2183, which allow a remote 
attacker to obtain clear text data via a birthday attack against a 
long-duration encrypted session [16]. 
   Another vulnerability that stands out is the CVE-2015-2808, 
affecting 22 of all scanned services. It is related to a deprecated 
RC4 algorithm that allows a remote attacker to conduct plaintext-
recovery attacks against the initial bytes of a stream by sniffing 
network traffic [17]. The confidentiality impact in CVSS is 
"partial", meaning that there is considerable informational
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Figure 4: Vulnerabilities and Confidentiality impact.
disclosure, however, the attacker does not have control over what 
is obtained, or the scope of the loss is constrained [15]. 
   The detailed list of vulnerabilities to which the Portuguese 
online public services are exposed and their underlying impact on 
the confidentiality of data being exchanged with users is presented 
in Figure 4. Overall, 65% of the analyzed services had, at least, 
one known vulnerability active in their servers by the time of this 
scanning process. 
   Beyond the known vulnerabilities, the results have shown that 
28 weak ciphers and 7 broken ciphers are still supported in secure 
communications. In this sense, only 27% of all analyzed domains 
allow data exchanging based solely in strong ciphers. Table 2 
presents the most frequent situations of weak or broken ciphers 
being supported by different cryptography suites. 
   Figure 5 summarizes the results of a more comprehensive 
analysis provided through SSL Lab. It aims at establishing a 
simple assessment index regarding SSL/TLS server configuration. 
Such evaluation takes into consideration aspects like certificate 
trustworthiness, protocol support, key exchange, and cipher 
strength. The assessment index ranges from A+ for servers with 
exceptional configurations, no warnings, and HTTP Strict 
Transport Security support to T, when there is no certificate 
trust11. 
   As presented in Figure 5, 42% of the services considered in the 
present work have received grade A+ or A, representing public 
services with solid posture regarding the security of citizen data 
being exchanged through public networks. However, it is not 
observed for the majority of the services currently offered to 
Portuguese citizens, as manifold sensitive problems are observed 
for the remaining 58% of analyzed servers. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The fast growth of public services being offered through the 
internet has also sparked concerns regarding privacy and security 
of data traversing public and uncontrolled networks. Moreover, 
providing mechanisms for authenticity verification is a key aspect 
towards citizen engagement to such services. 
                                                                  
11 More details regarding the rating criteria can be find in 
https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-Server-Rating-Guide 
By resorting to non-invasive scanning methodologies, this 
work has identified that most of the main online public services 
provided in Portugal have serious problems regarding data 
security and trustworthiness. 
 
Figure 5: Global result from SSL Lab. 
 
 
      One of the main problems found is related to the support of 
legacy protocols and, consequently, weak or broken ciphers. 
Considering that most of the softwares providing secure 
communications to online services are of easy and flexible 
configuration, even after the service deployment, such scenario 
might indicate a lack of continuous evaluation of the risks related 
to the cryptographic suites selected in the service design stages.
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Table 2: Availability of weak or broken ciphers. 
Cipher Status Number of suites supporting it 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA Weak 58 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA Weak 57 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 Weak 47 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 Weak 46 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Weak 39 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Weak 38 
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 Weak 32 
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA Broken 20 
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 Broken 19 
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA Broken 6 
 
 
   Following reports from public vulnerability databases or relying 
on a centralized group of experts able to handle computer security 
incidents (i.e., a Computer Emergency Response Team – CERT) 
could provide relevant inputs to professionals in charge of the 
diverse online services across the country at a low cost and high 
efficiency. It also should involve investing in continuous people 
qualification [18], as this area is in constant and fast development. 
In addition, regular auditing processes have the potential to 
reduce the service exposition to known vulnerabilities. It might be 
conducted through open source and free tools, such nmap and SSL 
Lab used in the present study. Furthermore, a deeper perspective 
of potential security issues might be achieved through penetration 
testing activities. 
Another sensitive issue found in this research is the lack of or 
the use of untrusted digital certificates, which hampers the 
capacity of verifying whether an online service is provided by an 
authentic institution. This aspect raises serious concerns regarding 
attacks deployed to steal sensitive data from users. 
Overall, these finds show the same issues pointed out by 
previous related work [6], which observed that, worldwide, half of 
trusted leaf certificates contain an inadequately secure 1024-bit 
RSA key in their trust chain and that CAs were continuing to sign 
certificates using MD5 as late as April 2013. 
As future work, we intend to contact each institution 
considered in the present study with the aim at providing a 
detailed report comprehending the issues identified on their 
security posture regarding data being exchanged between their 
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